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INTHEUTAHCOURTOFAPPEALS

STATE OF lffAH,
Plaintiff/ Appellee,
vs.

Case No: 20140967-CA

v\TILLIAM TIRADO,

Defendant / Appellant.

REPLY BRIEF OF APPELIANT

*******
INTRODUCTORY NOTE
The State's brief, and its criticism of Tirado's reliance upon "extra-record"
evidence, demonstrates the difficulty criminal defendants face when they attempt
to use Rule 23B of the Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure to establish an
ineffective assistance of counsel (IAC) claim on direct appeal. As the State points
out, Tirado's "sole claim on appeal is that he was denied his Sixth Amendment
right to counsel because his attorney labored under an actual conflict of interest",
which "depends in large part on the extra-record proffer made ¼rith his rule 23B
motion." Appellee's Brief at 14. This is accurate. Much of Tirado's IAC claim
requires reference to facts not currently on the record, but facts which he has
good reason to believe will be shown if he is allowed to call witnesses at a hearing.

According to the Revised Order Pertaining to Rule 23B the "Appellate Court
may elect to adjudicate the motion separately or in conjunction '"rith its treatment
of the merits of other issues presented on appeal." That election, when and how
the appellate court will adjudicate the 23B motion, is unknovvn to a defendant as
he prepares and files his briefs on the 1nerits of his IAC claims. In cases like this
one, where the Court has elected not to rule upon the 23B motion or stayed the
briefing schedule, a defendant's briefs must by necessity refer to "extra-record"
evidence in order to argue his IAC clai1n. These defendants are placed 'between a
rock and a hard place' on direct appeal because they must fully brief their IAC
claims even before actually knm,ving exactly what the record on those claims will
look like. This is a ve1y difficult place to because, as the State points out
"Affidavits submitted in support of Rule 23B motions are not part of the record
on appeal and ¼rill be considered only to determine whether [to] grant or deny
the motion." Revised Order Pertaining to Rule 23B. So defendants whose IAC
claims depend upon the facts contained within their 23B motions are forced to
base their claims, which cannot be made on PCRA, upon facts which they are not
allowed to refer.
The Supreme Court issued its Revised Order Pertaining to Rule 23B "in the
interest of expediting the final disposition of criminal appeals", but in so doing it
may have created a 'Catch-22' 1 for those whose genuine issues depend upon
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See Utah Code §78B-9-106 (2010). According to the Post Conviction Remedies

Act (PCRA) "A person is not eligible for relief under this chapter upon any ground
2

G..

"extra-record" evidence. Tirade's claims of IAC based on an actual conflict of
interest, a conflict which is hinted at in the record, but patently clear from the
extra-record evidence. Unless and until that evidence is added to the record,
Tirado's right to raise and IAC claim is severely restricted.
ARGUMENT
I.

TRIAL COUNSEL PROVIDED INEFFECTIVE ASSISTANCE OF
COUNSEL FOR OPERATING UNDER AN ACTUAL CONFLICT
A. A Conflict of Interest Existed

The State's brief ignores the Rules of Professional Conduct discussed in
Tirado's opening brief. For example, the State acts as though trial counsel would

that ... was raised or addressed at trial or on appeal" or "could have been but was
not raised on appeal". So if IAC is raised on appeal based upon 'extra-record
evidence' attached to a 23B motion, and the 23B motion is denied, and then the
IAC claim is rejected because there is no record evidence of ineffectiveness, the
defendant cannot raise IAC in a PCRA action, because it "was raised or
addressed ... on appeal". This IAC claim \i\~ll never really have been heard on its
merits, and the only argument he will have been allowed to make would have
been without any factual support. But because it was raised on appeal, IAC
cannot be raised in PCRA. On the other hand, if IAC is not raised on appeal, the
PCRA statute bars a defendant from raising IAC where it "could have been but
was not raised on appeal". So if a defendant does not raise his IAC claims in his
briefs on appeal, because the 23B motion has not been granted yet, he would be
precluded from raising it on PCRA. The only exception to the PCRA eligibility
bar is in instances of ineffective assistance of appellate counsel. In other words, if
a defendant wants a court to hear the full merits of his IAC claim, including the
facts that support that claim, his 23B motion must be granted, or appellate
counsel must perform deficiently by not raising an IAC claim on appeal. And IAC
of appellate counsel for failing to raise IAC of trial counsel will be subject to a
conceivable tactical purpose review, thus making the attempt to preserve an IAC
claim for PCRA by not raising it on direct appeal a fool's errand. The only
defendants who can raise IAC claims on PCRA for trial counsel's performance
would be those whose appellate counsel gave no thought to IAC at all, or perhaps
those how were represented by the same attorney at trial and on appeal, a
practice discouraged by the courts.
3

have been free to disclose anything and everything about Courtney at Tirado's
trial because "Young's representation of Courtney for the charges that arose out
of the same events ended five months before defendant's trial..." Appel1ee's Brief
at 18. This is not ho\v lawyer/ client relationships \vork. Defense attorneys are not
free to disclose the information they learn about their clients the moment the
judge issues a sentence. The rule forbidding a lawyer from revealing "information
relating to the representation of a client" does not have an expiration date.
UT.R.PR0F.C0N. RULE 1.6. Attorneys are essentially bound to take our client's
secrets, information which could impeach them, and other information related to
the representation, to the grave. Trial counsel would not have been free to reveal
information about Courtney at Tirado's trial five years after Courtney was
sentenced, let alone five months later.
The State's argument infers that it believes, at the time of Tirado's trial,
Courtney was a former client, not a concurrent client. Given the fact that these
two defendants were charged with the same crime arising from the same facts,
this belief is a stretch at best. However, for the sake of argument a review of Rule
1.9 Duties to Former Clients, is helpful because it demonstrates that this
distinction is meaningless on the question of confidentiality and privilege. Under
that rule a "lawyer who has formerly represented a client in a matter ... shall not
thereafter: ... (2) reveal information relating to the representation except as these
Rules would permit or require with respect to a client." UT.R.PR0F.C0N. RULE 1.9.
The confidentiality in Rule 1.6 applies to current and former clients. See

4

Appellant's Brief at 10-11. So trial counsel would have been bound by the same
duties of confidentiality and privilege to Courtney even if Courtney became a
former client.
Most importantly the State atten1pts to argue there was no conflict of
interest because there was nothing about Courtney's circumstance, at the time of
Tirado's trial, that would have placed him in some danger of detriment if trial
counsel would have revealed what he knew about Courtney to Tirado's advantage.
It is as if the only way to create a conflict is if trial counsel has to throw one client
vi>

under the bus, in order to save the other. That is too high of a bar, and it is
inconsistent with the ethical rules that tell attorneys how they are obligated to
relate to their clients.
Conflicts of interest arise when counsel owes duties to multiple clients and
has to choose which duties he will fulfill or maintain, and which duties he will

~

abandon. The State has not contested that trial counsel the duties of competence
(Rule 1.1), of confidentiality (Rule 1.6), of conflict (Rules 1.7 and 1.8), and the
duty to former clients (Rule 1.9) to both Tirado and Courtney. When Tirado was
going to trial and trial counsel knew the State planned to prove Tirade's intent to
distribute was tied to Courtney and his possession of methamphetamine 2 counsel

At the preliminary hearing it was clear the State intended use the evidence and
statements collected from Courtney against Tirado. See R.216:26-27 (when
Courtney was arrested at Tirado's house he had methamphetamine on his
person), R.216:30-31 (in response to the fact that Tirado was not found to have
any drugs Vanderwarf acknowledge "it's not unusual that Mr. Tirado wouldn't
2
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would have known he could not violate his duty of confidentiality to Courtney in
order to confront and impeach him to show his statements did not implicate
Tirado. So instead, trial counsel decided to abandon his duty of competence to
Tirado. He abandoned his duty to present Tirado's best defense by declining to do
anything at odds with his duties of confidence and privilege to Courtney. Counsel
may have opted for what he thought was a middle ground approach, trying to
represent both clients ·without discussing the conflict or securing a waiver from
either client. But that middle ground actually was a choice to maintain the duties
to Courtney and abandon the duties to Tirado.
The State's argument that no conflict existed, because Courtney had nothing
to gain, is inconsistent with the Rules of Professional Conduct and the obviously
conflicting interest between Tirado and Courtney.3 This Court should reject the

have drugs on him but Carl Courtney would" because "Tirado has been know and
had, on previous occasions, gotten narcotics from Carl Courtney.").
3
Tirado has not been able to locate any Utah case on the question of whether the
inability of trial counsel to confront a witness demonstrates an actual conflict of
interest. However, a related question was posed to the Ohio Supreme Court's
Advisory Board of Commissioners on Grievances and Discipline. They were asked
to consider the question: "Does a lawyer's representation of a criminal defendant
create a conflict of interest if the lawyer will be required to cross-examine a
former client during the defendant's trial in a matter unrelated to the
representation of the former client?" Tirado recognizes that the exact question at
stake in this case would be 'in a matter related to the representation of the former
client?', but suggests that the Ohio advisory opinion may still have some helpful
analysis. Tirado has attached the opinion as an addendum for the Court to
consider if it finds it appropriate. It should be noted that the Ohio Rules of
Professional Conduct seem to be identical, or at least very similar, to the Utah
Rules. Without discussing every line of the Ohio opinion, Tirado would direct the
Court to the conclusion which states "If a current representation involves the
same or a substantially related matter and the current client's interests in the
6
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State's argument and simply read the rules in light of the facts presented at trial
~

by the State. Tirado and Courtney \t\1ere charged ·with the essentially the same
crime, ,,vhich was to be proved by overlapping the evidence and statements
obtained separately from each of them. Their interests were materially at odds,
and trial counsel's representation of them was liinited by that conflict. He should
never have continued as counsel for Tirado at trial. He had an ethical obligation
to withdraw and he failed to do that, which led to representation materially
impacted by the conflict.
B. The Conflict Impacted Counsel's Performance, Creating an
Actual Conflict of Interest
The cases explaining how an actual conflict of interest is demonstrated use
several seemingly different tests. The State is fond of citing the language of

Lafferty v. State, 2007 UT 73, ,I, 175 P.3d 530 which says "[t]o establish an
actual conflict, [a defendant] must demonstrate that 'counsel was forced to make
choices advancing other interests to the detriment of his client."' (Citing Taylor

v. State, 2007 UT 12, 1{123, 156 P.3d 739). In his opening brief Tirado cited State
~

v. Lovell, 1999 UT 40, ,124, 984 P.2d 382, which characterizes an actual conflict

as "turn[ing] on whether (1) other counsel likely would have approached the case
differently and (2) a tactical reason other than the alleged conflict existed for
[counsel's] decisions. (Citing State v. Webb, 790 P.2d 65, 67 (Utah App. 1990)).
While the State's preferred test seems to require more evidence, and obviously
~

~

matter are materially adverse to the former client, Prof.Cond.R. 1.9(a) dictates
that the la'\i\7Yer may not continue the current representation without the former
client's informed consent, confirmed in ,,vriting." Addendum A.
7

Tirado ,,vould prefer the Court to apply the more generous analysis, under either
analysis this case demonstrates an actual conflict of interest, from which
prejudice must be presumed.
The State frames the argument as requiring Tirado to prove "both that (1)
Young was in a position that would force him to make choices advancing
Courtney's interests to the detriment of [Tirado's] interests, and (2) Young
actually did so." Appellee's Brief at 15-16. The majority of the State's argument
focuses on the idea that because Courtney's case was over, there was no way trial
counsel could have advanced Courtney's interests, so no matter how much it may

{

'

'-:Y

have hurt Tirado, if it didn't hurt Courtney it wasn't an actual conflict. But the
State's argument assumes that there was no reason to keep Courtney's
confidential information confidential, or there was no reason not to betray the
lawyer/client relationship because Courtney had already pled guilty. In other
words, the State assumes Courtney could have no interest in the confidence of his
attorney unless it was protecting him in the underlying case. This assumption is
wrong.
This position would lead counsel to believe they could and should violate
their ethical duties of confidentiality, ignore the Rule of Professional Conduct,
and spill the beans as soon as the legal controversy with one client ends. It's as if
Johnny Cochran was free to disclose OJ Simpson's confessions, to the benefit of
any other client, the moment the trial ended because double jeopardy prevented
Simpson from being retried. That is not how confidentiality works, that is not

8

how 'furthering the client's interests', in this sense, works. Clients' interest is to
have the confidence of their attorney indefinitely into the future, regardless of
how their case is resolved.
Trial counsel, even now, even long after both cases have ended, m,ves a duty
to both Courtney and Tirado not to reveal any information related to the
representation. Courtney's interests were furthered by the very fact that his
counsel kept his confidential information confidential. Courtney's interests '"rere
furthered when his attorney did not reveal anything he learned in his
representation of Courtney at Tirado's trial. Courtney need not avoid going to jail,
a second time, in order to have his interests furthered. He gets to preserve his
lawyer/ client relationship, he gets to have his secrets kept secret, whatever they
may be. The detriment that would have come to Courtney, had trial counsel used
confidential and privileged information to benefit Tirado, is that Courtney would
have lost his lawyer/ client relationship, the very foundation of legal
representation. This is a real detriment, regardless of whether it could or would
result in additional criminal danger.

If the Court were considering the State's position as persuasive, that a
client's interests are not advanced by maintaining confidentiality beyond the end
of criminal liability, it should consider the broader negative implication such a
rule could have upon limiting the ethical obligation of attorneys to their former
clients. Exposure to criminal liability far from the only reason we want la"'7Yers to
keep their client's confidential information private. The State's position, that

9

Courtney had nothing to gain by trial counsel's loyalty, undermines the
foundation of lawyer/ client relationships in all areas of legal practice. This Court
should reject the State's extremely narrow interpretation of the Lafferty/Taylor
test.
Furthermore, the State's position would require Tirado on appeal to extract
from trial counsel confidential and privileged information about Courtney, the
very information trial counsel was ethically obligated not to share at trial. Trial
counsel's duties to Courtney have not changed simply because Tirado has been
convicted and now appeals. Trial counsel could not now reveal the private
information about Courtney to help Tirado on appeal any more than he could
have at trial. And Tirado could not be expected to know that information in order
to meet his burdens on appeal.
It does not matter whether the confidential or privileged information could
have hurt Courtney in his case, it only matters that trial counsel ethically cannot
and did not reveal it to help Tirado. This is sufficient to prove trial counsel was
forced to choose between his two clients. Proceeding to trial with Tirado in a case
where Tirado was convicted upon the evidence obtained from Courtney, without
objection, 'Without betraying any of Courtney's confidences, is sufficient to prove
trial counsel actually did choose to advance Courtney's interests at the expense of
Tirado's.

10
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~

II. TRIAL COUNSEL PROVIDED INEFFECTIVE ASSISTANCE OF
COUNSEL FOR FAILING TO PROTECT TIRADO'S RIGHT OF
CONFRONTATION DUE TO THE CONFLICT OF INTEREST

The State's brief does not address Tirado's claim that trial counsel's dual
representation prevented him from subjecting the statements provided by
Courtney to cross-examination or confrontation. A search of the State's brief
reveals no instance where the State discusses trial counsel's duty to "confront" or
cross-examine Courtney, about the drugs found on his person, about his history
of drug distribution, and most importantly about his admission to the police that
sometimes he sells drugs and, if her were to sell, it would be from the drugs found
on him. See R.217:138. As explained in Tirado's initial brief, trial counsel was
prevented by ethical obligations to Courtney from asserting Tirado's right to
confront Courtney ,,vhen the State introduced this evidence. See Appellant's Brief
at 20, 22, 23, 24. This evidence was crucial to the State's case and should not
~

have been admitted as hearsay in violation of Tirado's right to confront.
The State's silence on this issue should be taken as an acknowledgement
that counsel's performance was deficient. Any reasonable attorney would object
to admission of an alleged confession of a codefendant that violated the hearsay
rule and the right to confront. This is basic la'v\iyering. But trial counsel could not

~

object to hearsay or confrontation, because either of those objections would have
required the State to call Courtney as a witness and would have required trial
counsel to cross-examine and impeach his own client. Trial counsel could not
have done those things and he should not have gone to trial when it was obvious

11

that the State would need Courtney as a vvitness.
The State's silence on this question is not surprising, however, given how
obviously deficient it is for trial counsel to have allowed the State to admit such
blatantly inadmissible and unconstitutional evidence. Again, it is patently
deficient performance to fail to object to obvious hearsay and confrontation
violations. These are the result of counsel laboring under a conflict of interest,
counsel who could not adequately represent both Courtney and Tirado's
interests. There can be no doubt that an attorney who owed no duty to Courtney
would have been free to object, and would have objected, to the evidence offered
about and from Courtney. This objections would have forced the State either to
call Courtney, at which time he would be subject to confrontation (not to mention
free to exculpate Tirado as he says he would have done), or the State would have
declined to call Courtney and have been prevented from presenting the evidence
related to his statements.
If Courtney had been called as a witness, his out of court statements, that "if
he needed to sell it, he would sell from that specific amount" found on his person
(R.217:138), would have been directed away from Tirado by his testimony that he

did not "arrange to have [Tirado] act as a 'middleman' to arrange to sell
methamphetamine ... "Affidavit of Carl Courtney. All of the negative evidence
presented about Courtney, and used by the State to infer Tirado's intent to
distribute, could have been rebutted by Carl's testimony that he and Tirado were
not selling drugs together. The State's case depended upon that inference, and it

12

,vould have evaporated.
The State's argument, that if Courtney had been called as a witness his
"anticipated testimony [would have] added nothing material to the defense"
because the two "were cousins, permitting the inference that they might lie for
each other", or because Courtney had an extensive criminal record opening him
up to impeachment, Appellee's Brief at 24, cannot be taken seriously under the
circumstances. It was State's case that depended upon Courtney's statement
impliedly implicating Tirado. It makes no sense to say that Courtney's proposed
testimony denying he and Tirado were arranging to sell drugs ·with Lorenzo
would have no material impact, when the State's evidence, with the opposite
inference, is the only evidence which connected Tirado to any drugs that could
~

have been sold. As it stands, it is the State's case that depends upon Courtney's
credibility, and if he is impeached by his relationship to Tirado and his history, so
~

too is the State's inference implicating Tirado. What is bad for the goose, is bad
for the gander.
Courtney had the right to confront the witnesses against him, including
Courtney, his codefendant. Because Courtney was represented by the very
attorney who would have had to confront him, that attorney had a conflict of
interest. Counsel was forced to choose between questioning, impeaching, and
confronting one client, and adequately presenting another client's defense. Trial
counsel elected not to object to the State's admission of hearsay evidence in
violation of Tirade's right to confront. Counsel elected to allow the State to

13

incorrectly infer that Courtney's intent to distribute could be attributed to Tirado.
Counsel elected to allow the State to connect the drugs found in Courtney's
pocket to Tirado. That election was a decision to affirm and maintain the duties
counsel had to Courtney and deny Tirado the right to competent, diligent,
effective assistance of counsel. This is an actual conflict of interest. It advanced
Courtney's interests by maintaining the lawyer/client relationship and neglected
Tirado's interests in a full and complete defense. This Court should presume
prejudice.
CONCLUSION AND PRECISE RELIEF SOUGHT

Trial counsel operated under a conflict of interest, in that he represented
two clients with materially adverse interests. That conflict became an actual
conflict when trial counsel maintained his lawyer/client relationship, with all its
confidences and privileges, with Courtney rather than presenting a complete
defense for Tirado. This is ineffective assistance of counsel. Because trial counsel
had an actual conflict of interest this Court should presume prejudice and reverse
Tirado's conviction because he was denied effective assistance of counsel.
Because this case depends upon evidence not currently in the record, but
which Tirado has provided by affidavit in his 23B motion for remand, his Court
should temporarily remand this case to the district court for a hearing related to
ineffective assistance of counsel.
RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED this 8th day of June, 2016.

~
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OPINION 2013-4
Issued October 11, 2013
Cross-Examination of a Former Criminal Client in an Unrelated Matter
SYLLABUS: Under Prof.Cond.R. 1.7(a)(2), a conflict of interest is created if there is a
substantial risk that a lawyer's ability to consider, recommend, or carry out an
appropriate course of action for the client will be materially limited by the lawyer's
responsibilities to a former client. Prof.Cond.R. 1.9 details a lawyer's responsibilities to
a former client, which include a prohibition against using information relating to the
representation of a former client to the disadvantage of the former client. A lawyer may
not cross-examine a former client who is an adverse witness in a current representation
if it would violate Prof.Cond.R. 1.9. When a la,-vyer represented a former client in a
criminal case that ended in a conviction, the use of the conviction in a subsequent
unrelated case to impeach the former client is impermissible unless the lawyer can
satisfy one of the exceptions in Prof.Cond.R. 1.9(c)(l). These exceptions allow the crossexamination if the former client's conviction has become generally known or the use of
the conviction for impeachment of the former client is permitted or required by the
Rules of Professional Conduct. The cross-examination may also proceed upon the
informed consent of the former client. If the la½ryer cannot satisfy one of the
Prof.Cond.R. 1.9(c)(l) exceptions or obtain the former client's informed consent, the
lawyer must withdraw from the current representation and request permission to
withdraw if required.

QUESTION PRESENTED: Does a la,vyer's representation of a criminal defendant
create a conflict of interest if the lawyer will be required to cross-examine a former
client during the defendant's trial in a matter unrelated to the representation of the
former client?
APPLICABLE RULES:
Conduct

Rules 1.4, 1.6, 1.7, and 1.9 of the Ohio Rules of Professional

Op. 2013-4
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OPINION:

The Hypothetical
During the course of the representation of a criminal defendant, a public
defender may discover that he or she previously represented a prosecution wib1ess in a
prior, unrelated criminal case. A public defender reports this scenario is not
uncommon, and has requested guidance on whether a conflict of interest exists that
would prevent the public defender from continuing the current criminal representation.
For purposes of this opinion, the Board is asked to assume that the public defender no
longer represents the prosecution witness, that the witness was convicted in the prior
case, and that the underlying crime is an impeachable offense under Evid.R. 609. As
part of the current representation, the public defender may have to cross-examine the
prosecution witness/ former client regarding the prior offense in an effort to attack their
credibility. Because the requester of this opinion is a public defender, ,ve will address
the issue presented in that context, but our analysis is also applicable in both private
criminal and civil representations ,,vhere a lawyer must cross-examine a former client.
The Board briefly answered the requester's question in Advisory Opinion 2008-4,
which addresses the in1putation of conflicts in a public defender's office. A public
defender's cross-examination of former clients was outside the scope of Opinion 2008-4,
but the Board made the following independent statement: "If a former client in an
unrelated matter is a witness in a defendant's criminal case, an assistant county public
defender may represent the criminal defendant, but may not use or reveal information
of the former client that is protected from disclosure under [Prof.Cond.R. l.9(c)]."
(Emphasis in original.) Ohio Sup. Ct., Bd. of Comm'rs on Grievances and Discipline,
Op. 2008-4 (Aug. 15, 2008). This opinion will expand upon the Board's statement in
Opinion 2008-4.

Applicable Rules in Analysis of Conflicts of Interest Involving Fonner Clients
The scenario presented to the Board involves the interplay of Prof.Cond.R. 1.7
and 1.9. When a public defender learns that a current client's case may involve the
adverse testimony of a former client, the conflict analysis as to the current client begins
with Prof.Cond.R. 1.7. As stated in Prof.Cond.R. 1.7, Comment [1], "[t]he principles of
loyalty and independent judgment arc fundamental to the attorney-client relationship
and underlie the conflict of interest provisions of [the Rules of Professional Conduct].
Neither the lawyer's personal interest, the interests of other clients, nor the desires of
third persons should be permitted to dilute the la\vyer' s loyalty to the client. All
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potential conflicts of interest involving a new or current client must be analyzed under
[Prof.Cond.R. 1.7]."
Prof.Cond.R. 1.7(a) states as follows:
(a) A lawyer's acceptance or continuation of representation
of a client creates a conflict of interest if either of the
following applies:
(1) the representation of that client will be directly adverse to
another current client;

(2) there is a substantial risk that the lawyer's ability to
consider, recommend, or cany out an appropriate course of
action for that client will be materially limited by the
la·wyer's responsibilities to another client, a former client, or
a third person or by the lawyer's own personal interests.
Applying Prof.Cond.R. 1.7(a)(2) to the situation presented to the Board, 1 the public
defender's continued representation of the current client creates a conflict of interest if
there is a "substantial risk" that the public defender's ability to "consider, recommend,
or carry out an appropriate course of action for that client will be materially limited" by
the public defender's responsibilities to the former client. Prof.Cond.R. 1.0(m) defines
"substantial" as "a matter of real importance or great consequence."
"A lawyer's duties of loyalty and independence may be materially limited by
responsibilities to former clients under [Prof.Cond.R. 1.9]." Prof .Cond.R. 1.7, Comment
[18]. To ascertain a lawyer's responsibilities to a former client, then, we must next
consult Prof.Cond.R. 1.9. That rule states in pertinent part as follows:
(a) Unless the former client gives informed consent,
confirmed in writing, a lawyer who has formerly
represented a client in a matter shall not thereafter represent
another person in the same or a substantially related matter

1

Prof.Cond.R. 1.7(a)(1) is inapplicable as the public defender in this hypothetical is not simultaneously representing
clients with adverse interests.
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in which that person's interests are materially adverse to the
interests of the former client.
*
*
*
(c) A lawyer who has formerly represented a client in a
matter or whose present or former firm has formerly
represented a client in a matter shall not thereafter do either
of the following:
(1) use information relating to the representation to the
disadvantage of the former client except as these rules
would permit or require with respect to a client or when the
information has become generally known;
(2) reveal information relating to the representation except
as these rules would permit or require with respect to a
client.
Prof.Cond.R. 1.9. First considering Prof.Cond.R. 1.9(a), the interests of the public
defender's current client are materially adverse to the former client, ,vho will be
testifying for the prosecution. The requester of this opinion, though, has asked the
Board to assume that the cases involving the former and current clients are unrelated
matters. This opinion makes such an assumption, but ,ve note that under Prof.Cond.R.
1.9(a), the former client would have to provide informed consent, confirmed in writing,
for the public defender to represent the current client if the matters were the same or
substantially related.

Evaluating Obligations to the Fonner Client I Adverse Witness
Neither Prof.Cond.R. 1.7 nor Prof.Cond.R. 1.9 automatically ban a lawyer from
representing a client when an adverse trial witness is a former client and the current
matter is unrelated to the representation of the former client. Accord Ill. State Bar Assn.,
Op. 05-01 (Jan. 2006); Md. State Bar Assn., Commt. on Ethics, Op. 2004-24 (May 14,
2004); Utah State Bar, Ethics Advisory Op. Commt., Op. 02-06 (June 12, 2002). To the
contrary, a lawyer representing a client in a matter in which another current client is an
adverse witness likely faces a conflict of interest under Prof.Cond.R. 1.7. ABA Commt.
on Ethics and Prof'l Responsibility, Formal Op. 92-367 (1992). "When a lawyer is called
upon to cross-examine her own client, the lawyer may well be torn between a 'soft,' or
deferential, cross-examination, which compromises the representation of the litigation
client, and a vigorous one, which breaches the duty of loyalty to the client-witness." Id.
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at 3. Although the Board may not provide guidance on the legal question of a
defendant's constitutional right to the effective assistance of counsel, we note that the
courts view simultaneous representations (both the defendant and a co-defendant or
witness are current clients) and successive representations (either a co-defendant or
witness is a former client) differently in that context because in successive
representations the lawyer "is no longer beholden to the former client." Gillard v.
Mitchell, 445 F.3d 883, 891 (6th Cir. 2006). See also Moss v. United States, 323 F.3d 445 (6th
Cir. 2003); Smith v. Hofbauer, 312 F.3d 809 (6th Cir. 2002). Nevertheless, even in
completely unrelated matters, lawyers have specific obligations to former clients as set
forth in Prof.Cond.R. 1.9(c).
Returning to Prof.Cond.R. 1.7, the starting point for any conflict of interest
analysis, the public defender must determine ,,vhether his or her ability to carry out an
appropriate course of action for the current client will be materially limited by the
public defender's responsibilities to the former client. In other words, the public
defender must be able to provide competent and diligent representation to the current
client while also fulfilling his or her "continuing duties" to the former client ''\-vith
respect to confidentiality and conflicts of interest." Prof.Cond.R. 1.9, Comment [1].
This determination will depend upon the public defender's ability to properly crossexamine the former client for the benefit of the current client while also complying vvith
Prof.Cond.R. 1.9(c). If the public defender concludes that the cross-examination does
not require him or her to use information relating to the representation of the former
client to the disadvantage of the former client or to reveal such information, the public
defender does not run afoul of Prof.Cond.R. 1.9(c) and the current representation may
continue absent other conflict of interest issues.
The requester, though, indicates that the public defender may be required to use
evidence of the former client's criminal conviction for impeachment purposes at trial.
Because the public defender represented the former client in the criminal case providing
the basis for impeachment, evidence of the conviction would be "information relating to
the representation" under Prof.Cond.R. 1.9(c)(1). Unlike the "confidences and secrets"
approach to confidentiality in the nmv-repealed Code of Professional Responsibility, 2
information relating to the representation of a client includes both "matters
communicated in confidence by the client" and "all information relating to the
representation, whatever its source." Prof.Cond.R. 1.6, Comment [3]. The public
defender would present the conviction to attack the former client's credibility, so it
would be used to the "disadvantage" of the former client. Accordingly, the public

2

See former DR 4-101.
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defender's cross-examination of the former client on the prior conviction violates
Prof.Cond.R. 1.9(c)(1) unless the public defender is able to satisfy one of the exceptions
set forth in that provision.
Under Prof.Cond.R. 1.9(c)(1), the public defender would also be prohibited from
using any other information learned in the representation of the former client during
the cross-examination in the current criminal case. For example, if the former client
indicated to the public defender a willingness to lie under oath within the prior
representation, the public defender may not use that information against the former
client in the cross-examination. See 2 Restatement of the Law 3d, The Law Governing
Lawyers, Section 132, Comment f (2001).

Exceptions to the Provisions that Protect Fonner Clients in Unrelated Matters
Prof.Cond.R. l.9(c)(1) contains two exceptions that allow a lawyer to use
information relating to the representation of a former client to the disadvantage of the
former client. The first exception applies when the information has become "generally
known." The second exception allows a lawyer to use the information to the
disadvantage of the former client if it is permitted or required by the Rules of
Professional Conduct (Rules).

a.

"Generally Known" Exception

As stated in the commentary to Prof.Cond.R. 1.9, "the fact that a lawyer has once
served a client does not preclude the lawyer from using generally known information
about that client when later representing another client." Prof.Cond.R. 1.9, Comment
[8]. The term "known" denotes "actual knowledge of the fact in question" and "a
person's knowledge may be inferred from circumstances." Prof.Cond.R. 1.0(g). The
phrase "generally known," however, is not defined in the Rules, Model Rules, or any of
the accompanying comments. As a result, the fol1owing Restatement definition has
been referenced when determining whether information relating to a representation is
generally known:
Whether information is generally known depends on all
circumstances relevant in obtaining the information.
Information contained in books or records in public libraries,
public-record depositaries such as government offices, or in
publicly accessible electronic-data storage is generally
known if the particular information is obtainable through
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publicly available indexes and similar methods of access.
Information is not generally known ,vhen a person
interested in knowing the information could obtain it only
by means of special knowledge or substantial difficulty or
expense. Special knowledge includes information about the
whereabouts or identity of a person or other source from
which the information can be acquired, if those facts are not
themselves generally known.
1 Restatement of the La,,v 3d, The La,,v Governing La,,vyers, Section 59, Comment d
(2001). See also In re Adelphia Communications Corp., S.D.N.Y. No. 02-41729REG, 2005 WL
425498 (Feb. 16, 2005), citing Cohen v. Wolgin, E.D.Pa. No. 87-2007, 1993 WL 232206 (June
24, 1993). "[T]he reason for the exception allowing use of information relating to the
former representation when the information has bec01Tte generally known is that at that
point the rationale for requiring confidentiality no longer exists." ABA Ctr. for Prof'l
Responsibility, A Legislative History: The Development of the ABA Model Rules of
Professional Conduct 1982-2005, at 220 (2006) (revie,ving the history of Model Rule 1.9).

z.

Existence of Criminal Conviction

Upon review of motions for withdrawal or disqualification of counsel in criminal
cases that are based upon former-client conflicts, courts have taken the view that a
former client's criminal conviction is generally known because it is a matter of public
record. See State v. Rogers, 231 W.Va. 205, 744 S.E.2d 315 (2013); United States v. Valdez,
149 F.R.D. 223 (D.Utah 1993); State v. Sustaita, 183 Ariz. 240, 902 P.2d 1344 (Ariz.App.
1995); State v. Mancilla, Minn.App. No. A06-581, 2007 WL 2034241 ( July 17, 2007). On
the broader issue of lawyers facing former clients on the wih1ess stand, Ohio courts
evaluating allegations of the ineffective assistance of counsel have con~luded that a
lav.ryer' s prior representation of a witness is not a per se conflict. See, e.g., State v.
Lorraine, 66 Ohio St.3d 414,613 N.E.2d 212 (1993); State v. McDonald, 4th Dist. Lawrence
No. 09CA4, 2009-Ohio-5132; State v. Jones, 5th Dist. Stark Nos. 2007-CA-00041 and 2007CA-00077, 2008-Ohio-1068.
In general, criminal convictions are matters of public record and are usually
accessible through public databases not requiring any particular expertise to obtain the
conviction information. Standard practice for prosecutors would be to obtain the
criminal records of their witnesses, possibly from the witnesses themselves, and this
information must be supplied to the public defender during discovery. See Crim.R.
16(B)(2). The fact that the public defender receives the criminal record of the former
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client from the prosecutor diminishes the "rationale for requiring confidentiality"
referenced in the legislative history to Model Rule 1.9. Additionally, as a matter of tdal
strategy, prosecutors may even elicit testimony regarding the former client's prior
conviction on direct examination. These characteristics likely place the former client's
criminal conviction in the scenario presented to the Board \vithin the realm of
information that is generally known. Based upon the Restatement definition, the fact
that criminal histories of witnesses are exchanged during discovery, and the case law on
former-client conflict allegations, the Board's view is that as long as the public
defender's cross-examination of the former client is limited to the existence of the prior
conviction for impeachment, the public defender can satisfy the "generally known"
exception in Prof.Cond.R. l.9(c)(l). 3 If competent representation of the current client
requires the public defender to use additional information relating to the representation
of the former client to their disadvantage, the public defender must make an individual
determination as to whether this additional information is also generally known.
ll.

Other Information in the Public Record

Outside the context of the record of a criminal conviction in the scenario before
the Board, lawyers are cautioned that the presence of information lfin the public record
does not necessarily mean that the information is generally known within the meaning
of Rule 1.9(c)." See Bennett, Cohen & Whittaker, Annotat-ed Model Rules of Professional
Conduct, 175 (7 th Ed. 2011), citing Pallon v. Raggio, D.N.J. Nos. 04-3625 (JAP) and 06-1068
(FLW), 2006 WL 2466854 (Aug. 24, 2006); Steel v. Gen. Motors Corp., 912 F.Supp. 724
(D.N.J. 1995); In re Anonymous, 932 N.E.2d 671 (Ind. 2010). "[T]he fact that information
has become known to some others does not deprive it of protection if it has not become
generally known in the relevant sector of the public." 1 Restatement, Section 59,
Comment d. TI1e following cases provide additional instruction on this issue:
Disciplinary Counsel v. Cicero, 134 Ohio St.3d 311, 2012-Ohio-5457, 982 N.E.2d 650 (drug
raid in which federal agents seized college football memorabilia was generally known,
information learned during a meeting with a prospective client was not); In re Gordon
Propert-ies, L.L.C., U.S. Bankr. Ct., E.D. Va., Nos. 09-18086-RGM and 12-1562-RGM, 2013
WL 681430, f.n. 6 (Feb. 25, 2013), quoting Va. State Bar, Legal Ethlcs Commt., Op. 1609
(Sept. 4, 1995) ("information regarding a judgment obtained by a law firm on behalf of a
client, 'even though available in the public record, is a secret, learned within the
attorney-client relationship"'); Emmanouil v. Raggio, D.N.J. No. 06-1068, 2008 WL
1790449 (Apr. 18, 2008) (information regarding civil defendant's testimony in a prior
3

This statement assumes that the prior conviction has not been expunged. Under Evid.R. 609(C), evidence of a prior
conviction is not admissible if the conviction "has been the subject of a pardon, annulment, expungement, certificate
of rehabilitation, or other equivalent procedure***."
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case \,vas generally known \-vhen defendant disclosed the information to the plaintiff
and the prior case was a matter of public record); Sealed Party v. Sealed Party, S.D.Tex.
No. Civ.A. H-04-2229, 2006 WL 1207732 (May 4, 2006) (information in press release
announcing a civil settlement that was in the public record was generally known, the
fact that the case settled and the lawyer's impressions about the case were not); In re
Adelphia Communications, supra, (list of properties owned by particular parties was not
generally known information; information was publicly available, but would require
substantial difficulty or expense to produce a list of the properties owned by the parties
and related entities); Cohen v. Wolgin, E.D.Pa. No. 87-2007, 1993 WL 232206 (June 24,
1993) (magazine and newspaper articles, published court decisions, court pleadings,
and public records in a government office are generally known; pleadings filed under
seal and records of an international court are not). As evidenced by these cases,
particularly in civil matters, whether information in a public record is generally known
may require a review of the applicable facts and circumstances.

b.

"Permitted or Required by the Rules" Exception

The second exception in Prof.Cond.R. 1.9(c)(l) that allows a lawyer to use
information relating to the representation of a former client to the disadvantage of the
former client applies when the use is permitted or required by the Rules. Stated another
way, information about a former client may be used "in ways that would be permitted
were the relationship still in effect." Bennett, Cohen & Whittaker at 174. An application
of this exception would typically involve Prof.Cond.R. 1.6, which governs the lavvyer's
duty of confidentiality to the client. Prof.Cond.R. 1.6(b) sets forth circumstances under
which a lawyer is permitted to reveal confidential client information, and Prof.Cond.R.
1.6(c) mandates the release of confidential client information in certain instances. In the
scenario presented to the Board, the public defender could use information relating to
the representation of a former client to the disadvantage of the former client if
permitted or required under Prof.Cond.R. 1.6 or another provision of the Rules.
Although Prof.Cond.R. 1.9(c)(l) may permit the use of former-client information
in certain circumstances, Prof.Cond.R. 1.9(c)(2) makes clear that the public defender still
has a continuing duty of confidentiality to the former client. These provisions
distinguish "using" former-client information from "revealing" such information.
Prof.Cond.R. 1.9(c)(2), which is identical to Model Rule 1.9(c)(2), "prohibits any
disclosure (as opposed to use) of former-client :information that would not be permitted
in connection with a current client, regardless of whether the information has become
generally known." Id. at 175.
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Informed Consent or i'\litlzdrawal
When faced with the cross-examination of a former client that requires the use of
information relating to the prior representation to the detriment of the former client, a
public defender may conclude that he or she cannot satisfy either of the exceptions in
Prof.Cond.R. 1.9(c)(1). That is, the information is not generally known and the use of
the information is not permitted or required by the Rules. In this situation, the public
defender may either obtain the former client's informed consent or seek permission to
withdraw from the current representation. The provisions of [Prof.Cond.R. 1.9] are for
the protection of former clients and can be waived if the client gives informed consent."
Prof.Cond.R. 1.9, Comment [9]. "'Informed consent" is an "agreement by a person to a
proposed course of conduct after the lawyer has communicated adequate information
and explanation about the material risks of and reasonably available alternatives to the
proposed course of conduct." Prof.Cond.R. 1.0(f). With the informed consent of the
former client as defined in Prof.Cond.R. 1.0(f), the public defender may use information
relating to the representation of the former cUent to their disadvantage.
0

The public defender may not be able to obtain the former client's informed
consent to the use of disadvantageous information about the former client's
representation. Given that the former client is an adverse wib1ess, competent and
diligent representation of the current client probably requires the cross-examination and
potential impeachment of the former client. If the public defender is unable to fulfill
this obligation to the current client, cannot satisfy one of the exceptions in Prof.Cond.R.
1.9(c)(1), or secure the former client's informed consent, the public defender must
withdraw from the current representation. Because the current matter is a criminal case,
the public defender must move the court for permission to withdraw. As stated in
Prof.Cond.R. 1.16, Comment [3], "[w]hen a lawyer has been appointed to represent a
client, withdrawal ordinarily requires approval of the appointing authority. * * *
Similarly, court approval or notice to the court is often required by applicable law
before a lawyer withdra,vs from pending litigation."

The Lawyer's Individual View of Conflicts of Interest
Even if the public defender is able to comply with Prof.Cond.R. 1.9 in a case
where a former client is an adverse wib1ess, there may be unique aspects of the
representation of the former client that cause the public defender to conclude that a
material limitation conflict still exists under Prof.Cond.R. 1.7(a)(2). See United States v.
Oberoi, 331 F.3d 44 (2003) (a lawyer should not be required against his or her own
judgment to continue a representation that involves the impeachment of a former

.r.~,
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client). In this instance, to resolve the conflict, the public defender must take steps to
ameliorate it as set forth in Prof.Cond.R. 1.7(b). These steps include evaluating whether
the public defender can competently and diligently represent the client affected by the
conflict of interest, consulting with the client affected by the conflict, and obtaining the
client's informed consent, confirmed in ,vriting. Prof.Cond.R. 1.7, Comment [2]. If the
public defender cannot ameliorate the conflict, he or she may not accept or continue the
representation. In situations where a public defender's representation of a client is
prohibited by law, the conflict is nonconsentable under Prof.Cond.R. 1.7(c)(l).

Imputation of Conflicts
Under the concept of imputed disqualification, "[w]hile la\vyers are associated in
a firm, none of them shall represent a client when the lawyer knmvs or reasonably
should know that any one of them practicing alone would be prohibited from doing so
by [Prof.Cond.R. 1.7 or 1.9]." Prof.Cond.R. 1.10(a). Similarly, Prof.Cond.R. 1.9(c)
obligates all of the lawyers in a firm to the former clients of the firm. "[A] firm of
lawyers is essentially one lavvyer for purposes of the rules governing loyalty to the
client, [and]*** each lawyer is vicariously bound by the obligation of loyalty owed by
each lawyer ·with ,.vhom the lawyer is associated." Prof.Cond.R. 1. 10, Comment [2]. As
defined in Prof.Cond.R. 1.0(c), a "firm" includes public defender organizations.
Accordingly, even when a different public defender in the same office represented the
former client/ adverse witness, if that public defender would be prohibited by
Prof.Cond.R. 1.7 or 1.9 from representing the current client, all of the public defenders
in the office are disqualified under Prof.Cond.R. 1.10. See also Advisory Opinion 2008-4.
For this reason, a former-client conflict cannot be cured by "handing off" the crossexamination to another public defender in the same office. All of the public defenders
in that office are bound by the prohibitions against using and disclosing former-client
information except as permitted by Prof.Cond.R. 1.9. Imputed disqualifications,
though, "may be waived by the affected client under the conditions stated in
[Prof.Cond.R. 1.7(b)]." Prof.Cond.R. 1.lO(e).

Duty to Communicate with the Current Client
Although the focus of this opinion is a lawyer's obligation to former clients, the
public defender's primary responsibility in this hypothetical is to the current client.
Under Prof.Cond.R. 1.4(b), the public defender is required to "explain a matter to the
extent reasonably necessary to permit the client to make informed decisions regarding
the representation." Consistent with the public defender's duty to communicate with
the current client, when the public defender learns that an adverse witness is a former
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client, he or she is advised to disclose this information to the current client. This
disclosure should occur whether or not the public defender concludes that the crossexamination of the former client is permissib]e under Prof.Cond.R. 1.7 and 1.9. The
Board also recommends that the public defender notify the court of potential conflicts
involving adverse wib1esses as soon as practicable.
In closing, the Board recognizes that the Rules often do not provide a bright-line
indication of whether a representation creates a material limitation conflict of interest
under Prof.Cond.R. 1.7(b )(2). A la'v\ryer' s conflict analysis requires consideration of a11
of the relevant facts and circumstances and involves both objective and subjective
elements of evaluation. As stated in the Preamble to the Rules, "The Ohio Rules of
Professional Conduct often prescribe rules for a lawyer's conduct. Within the
framework of these rules, however, many difficult issues of professional discretion can
arise. These issues must be resolved through the exercise of sensitive professional and
moral judgment guided by the basic principles underlying the rules." Rules, Preamble:
A Lawyer's Responsibilities, at <j[ 9.
CONCLUSION:

When a lawyer learns that a current representation may require the crossexamination of an adverse wih1ess who is a former client, the lawyer must analyze the
potential conflict under Prof.Cond.R. 1.7 and 1.9. Prof.Cond.R. 1.7(a)(2) indicates that a
conflict of interest is created in the current representation if there is a substantial risk
that the lawyer's ability to consider, recommend, or carry out an appropriate course of
action for the client will be materially limited by the lal-vyer' s responsibilities to the
former client. The lawyer's responsibilities to the former dient are articulated in
Prof.Cond.R. 1.9. If a current representation involves the same or a substantially related
matter and the current client's interests in the matter are materially adverse to the
former client, Prof.Cond.R. 1.9(a) dictates that the lawyer may not continue the current
representation without the former client's informed consent, confirmed in writing.

If the current matter and the matter involving the former client are unrelated, the
former client does not have to consent to the current representation, but the lawyer
must comply with Prof.Cond.R. 1.9(c). That provision prohibits the lawyer from using
information relating to the representation of the former client to the disadvantage of the
former client unless the information has become generally known or the Rules of
Professional Conduct permit or require such use. Prof.Cond.R. 1.9(c) also prohibits the
lawyer from revealing information relating to the representation of the former client
except as permitted or required by the Rules.
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In this opinion, the Board was asked ,vhether a public defender may present
evidence of a prior conviction to impeach a former client. The public defender
represented the former client in the case that led to the conviction and did not learn of
the former client's potential adverse testimony until the current representation was
underway. Impeachment of the former client violates Prof.Cond.R. 1.9(c) because the
public defender v-wuld be using information relating to the prior representation to
attack the credibility of the former client, which would disadvantage the former client.
However, the public defender may proceed ,vith the current representation if the
former client's criminal conviction is generally known, the use of former-client
information is permitted or required by the Rules of Professional Conduct, or the
former client provides informed consent. Absent these conditions, the public defender
must seek permission from the court to withdraw from the current representation.

Advisory Opinions of the Board of Commissioners on Grievances and Discipline are
informal, nonbinding opinions in response to prospective or hypothetical questions
regarding the application of the Supreme Court Rules for the Government of the Bar
of Ohio, the Supreme Court Rules for the Government of the Judiciary, the Ohio
Rules of Professional Conduct, the Ohio Code of Judicial Conduct, and the
Attorney's Oath of Office.

